Forming perceptions and the limits to public participation on ocean commons by Hadjimichael, Maria & Delaney, Alyne
 
  
 
Aalborg Universitet
Forming perceptions and the limits to public participation on ocean commons
Hadjimichael, Maria; Delaney, Alyne
Published in:
International Journal of the Commons
DOI (link to publication from Publisher):
10.18352/ijc.693
Creative Commons License
CC BY 3.0
Publication date:
2017
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication from Aalborg University
Citation for published version (APA):
Hadjimichael, M., & Delaney, A. (2017). Forming perceptions and the limits to public participation on ocean
commons. International Journal of the Commons, 11(1), 200-219. https://doi.org/10.18352/ijc.693
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ?
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at vbn@aub.aau.dk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: November 28, 2020
International Journal of the Commons
Vol. 11, no 1 2017, pp. 200–219
Publisher: Uopen Journals
URL:http://www.thecommonsjournal.org
DOI: 10.18352/ijc.693
Copyright: content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License
ISSN: 1875-0281
Forming perceptions and the limits to public participation on 
ocean commons: evidence from a citizens jury workshop
Maria Hadjimichael
Postdoctoral Researcher, Department of Social and Political Sciences, University of Cyprus, 
Cyprus
maria.m.hadjimichael@gmail.com
Alyne Elizabeth Delaney
Head of Research, Innovative Fisheries Management (IFM), Aalborg University, Denmark
ad@ifm.aau.dk
Abstract: This article presents data from a citizens jury-inspired deliberative 
workshop held to tease out stakeholder views of management priorities for a 
section of the North Sea: the Dogger Bank. As this article reveals, the lessons 
learned from the Dogger Bank workshop advocate not simply what is required 
for managing one particular ocean commons, but also highlight some of the pub-
lic participation research design failings, taking public participation in resource 
management further by adding to the literature and theoretical discussions on the 
public sphere. Analysis of the citizens jury-inspired deliberative workshop also 
highlights the critical issue of power inherent, yet often unacknowledged, in pub-
lic participation in environmental management. Stakeholder opinions uncovered 
through workshop discussions also show how commons are viewed today – as 
an economic resource – highlighting the trend of the mainstreaming of the com-
modification of the commons.
Keywords: Citizens jury, commodification, common heritage of mankind, North 
Sea, ocean commons, public participation
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1. Introduction
Public views of, and public participation in, the management of commons are 
increasingly being recommended and sought after in environmental management 
processes. Such inclusion of public views is considered a requirement in contem-
porary environmental governance (Fischer 1993; Newig 2007; Epstein et al. 2014; 
Drazkiewicz et al. 2015) and the form it takes varies from on-line consultations 
(Schulz and Newig 2015) to open hearings (Irvin and Stansbury 2004) to including 
stakeholders on advisory committees (Griffin 2007). This article presents data from 
a research-led citizens jury-inspired deliberative workshop held to tease out stake-
holder views of management priorities for a section of the North Sea: the Dogger 
Bank. As this article reveals, the lessons learned from the Dogger Bank workshop 
advocate not simply what is required for managing one particular ocean commons, 
but also highlight some of the public participation research design failings, taking 
public participation in resource management further by adding to the literature and 
theoretical discussions on the public sphere (Habermas 1989). Analysis of the citi-
zens jury-inspired deliberative workshop also highlights the critical issue of power 
inherent, yet often unacknowledged, in public participation in environmental man-
agement. Stakeholder opinions uncovered through an analysis of workshop discus-
sions also show how commons are viewed today – as an economic resource.
The Dogger Bank is a major sand bank below sea level rising off the sea bottom 
in the middle of the North Sea. The bank stretches through the Exclusive Economic 
Zones1 (EEZs) of four EU member states: Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands 
and the UK. A number of important economic activities are currently taking place 
in the Dogger Bank such as fishing, sand and gravel extraction, whilst due to the 
shallowness of the bank, it has been proposed by the UK as a wind farm develop-
ment site. Under the EU Habitats Directive (HD) for the conservation of biodiver-
sity, all EU member states were to designate sites for the protection of the habitat 
types and species occurring in their territories and offshore waters by 2012. The 
Dogger Bank falls under one of the habitat types to be protected (as habitat type 
1110) ‘sandbanks slightly covered by seawater all the time.’ Designated sites for 
protection under the HD are known as Special Areas of Conservation (SACs). The 
Dogger Bank is a candidate SAC and Site of Community Importance (SCI) site as 
the UK, the Netherlands and Germany have designated their parts of the Dogger 
Bank as SAC as part of their implementation of the EU Habitats Directive for the 
conservation of biological diversity. SACs are protected areas that are managed to 
maintain or restore habitats or species by regulating human activities.
1 EEZs are the zone from the boundary of territorial waters 12 nautical miles off the coast to 200 
nautical miles off the coast to which member states enjoy exclusive rights to resource exploitation.
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As noted above, the Dogger Bank is a part of the North Sea. Such seas and 
oceans, as commons, hold common pool resources (CPRs) within their bounds. 
Common pool resources are resources, which, by virtue of their nature, are particu-
larly difficult to divide, contain, or to exclude others from accessing (Young 2001; 
Griffin 2013). Governing such commons and CPRs, such as oceanic fisheries, is 
especially challenging given the complexities of managing mobile CPRs across 
international boundaries (Berkes et al. 2006; Epstein et al. 2014). Furthermore, as 
laid out in Ostrom’s design principles (1990), and supported by later study (e.g. 
Cox et al. 2010), user participation, particularly at the lower levels, is important 
for successful environmental governance (Epstein et al. 2014). 
In contemporary society, seas, such as the North Sea – and with it, the Dogger 
Bank – are also considered public goods in the sense that they do not belong to 
someone specifically but rather fall under the jurisdiction of certain nations to 
manage on behalf of the public. Since they are public goods, there is an accepted 
view that everyday citizens have an interest and stake in the goods and resources, 
as stakeholders (Webler et al. 2001). Additionally, there is a view that ocean com-
mons should be considered common heritage of mankind (CHM); some areas, 
“localities,” are advocated as belonging to all humanity and the resources of such 
areas should be available for the benefit of all (Taylor 2014). The concept of 
CHM includes “natural and cultural heritage”, and both tangible and intangible 
elements, and has become relevant to the wider debate of transforming the role 
of the state from focusing on the protection of national (economic) interests, to 
include responsibility to protect ecological systems for the benefit of all (Taylor 
2014). It is argued that the commons and “common-ing” is really about people 
(Meretz 2014); the whole conception of the commons is a social practice that gen-
erates, uses and preserves these resources, and how such utilisation is structured. 
The human element is what makes commons, commons. 
The rise of environmentalism has also seen citizens increasingly interested 
and invested in nature and the environment. Views on the importance of protecting 
the environment have been stable over the last several decades (Lowe and Rüdig 
1986). In recent years in the fisheries in particular, environmentalist and conser-
vation stakeholders increased their presence on advisory bodies (e.g. the North 
Sea Advisory Council for fisheries) as well as their influence on decision-making 
compared to traditional stakeholders (e.g. fishermen) due to greater budgets and 
staffing (Ounanian et al. 2012). Despite this increased presence and influence, 
one study into the governance of the North Sea Advisory Council (Griffin 2007) 
suggests that though the process is considered to be pluralistic and deliberative, 
governance arrangements tend to isolate the more ‘radical voices’ and give power 
to dominating discourses of rationality, such as the structural domination of a 
growth and jobs discourse. Such forums can be described as Habermas’ idea of 
public sphere “as that of a body of ‘private persons’ assembled to discuss matters 
of ‘public concern’ or ‘common interest’” (Fraser 1990).
Parallel with the rise of citizens invested in the environment, is the rise of citi-
zens invested in the governing process. In contemporary society, good governance 
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takes into account the opinions of citizens (Magnette 2003). Thus, stakeholders 
are provided with opportunities to give their voice in the process of environmental 
governance. Arguments for increased citizen participation often stem from the 
belief that engaged citizens participating in the process are better than passive 
citizens (King et al. 1998; Irvin and Stansbury 2004). “With citizen participation, 
formulated policies might be more realistically grounded in citizen preferences, 
the public might become more sympathetic evaluators of the tough decisions that 
government administrators have to make, and the improved support from the pub-
lic might create a less divisive, combative populace to govern and regulate” (Irvin 
and Stansbury 2004, 55).
Though there has been a rise in such demand for public participation in envi-
ronmental decision-making, decision-making has not shifted from a centralized 
authority. Consequently, different methods are being used to ensure a pluralis-
tic consultation process. Both the method and the extent of the consultation vary 
between countries; from public hearings to web-based consultations, to meetings 
with selected interest group representatives (Newig and Fritsch 2009). As these 
methods became well established and part of public policy-making, studies assessed 
the efficacy of different forms of participatory governance from online consultation 
(Schulz and Newig 2015) to public participation in local environmental planning 
(Drazkiewicz et al. 2015). Key messages from the literature suggest that whilst 
deciding on participatory methods it is important to have a clear understanding 
about why you should consult stakeholders, with whom you should consult, and 
about what aspect. Deliberative approaches offer promise for achieving the goals of 
more effective, informed and meaningful participation, as they have the potential 
to foster a more engaged, public spirited citizenry (Abelson et al. 2003). To further 
understand and develop on a framework that allows a better understanding of envi-
ronmental perceptions, we deconstruct discussions that took place during a citizens 
jury-inspired deliberative workshop on the Dogger Bank, North Sea.
Analysis of the deliberative workshop discussions uncover two main findings: 
first, the issue of power inherent in public participation in environmental manage-
ment is critical, yet often unacknowledged; and second, commons are viewed as 
an economic resource. 
To explore these findings, the article presents background to theory behind 
public participation; it next presents the Dogger Bank case study, explaining for 
whom and for what, the Dogger Bank is being managed. The article then pres-
ents our research methodology, explaining how we conducted our deliberative 
workshop as an adaptation of a citizens jury. After presenting our analysis of the 
workshop, we conclude with our view on limits to public participation in manage-
ment of ocean commons. 
2. Deliberative democracy
A public participation process in which “interactions are egalitarian, un-coerced, 
competent, and free from delusion, deception, power and strategy” (Smith and 
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Wales 2000, 53) though ideal, it has little to do with the actual practices which 
takes place at such events (Joss and Brownlea 1999; Mouffe 1999; Jensen 2005; 
Horst and Irwin 2010). Deliberative democracy is embodied in the assump-
tion that individuals can be transformed in the course of deliberative processes 
that bolster communicative rationality (Dryzek 2000). In deliberation, citizens 
exchange arguments and consider different claims that are designed to secure 
the public good. Through this conversation, citizens can come to an agreement 
about what procedure, action, or policy will best produce the public good. One of 
the early influences of deliberative democratic theory was the philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas. Habermas (1989) explored the concept of the public sphere, as a prod-
uct of democracy, and described it as a realm within social life in which public 
opinion can be formed and which is accessible to all. Habermas (1984) later criti-
cized his theory on the public sphere, and suggested that the contemporary public 
sphere, as a product of liberal democracy is characterised by an erosion of its criti-
cal roles and capacities, recruited for the use of hidden policies by interest groups; 
where the public is no longer made out of masses of individuals but of organized 
people that institutionally exerting their influence on the public sphere and debate. 
When talking about deliberative democracy, it is important however to high-
light the dimension of power and antagonism and the way such dimensions inhibit 
having an effective and legitimate type of deliberation (Mouffe 1999; Dryzek 
2000). As Mouffe (2005, 3) points out: “there is much talk today of ‘dialogue’ and 
‘deliberation’ but what is the meaning of such words in the political field, if no 
real choice is at hand and if the participants in the discussion are not able to decide 
between clearly differentiated alternatives”? 
Deliberation can refer to two kind of discussions; one that involves the careful 
and serious weighing of reasons for and against some proposition, and another of 
an interior process by which an individual weighs reasons for and against courses 
of action (Fearon 1998). The importance for deliberative methods is emphasized 
in the democratic discourse, suggesting that policies should be justified through 
the exchange of reasons and arguments relevant to all, rather than being the result 
of competition between private or personal interests where the most powerful 
lobby wins out (Weinstock and Kahane 2010). Formal deliberative processes have 
been successful in aiding understanding and meeting consensus in complex and 
difficult decision problems which involve more than one decision-maker (Proctor 
and Drechsler 2006). In the United Kingdom, there has been experimentation 
with deliberative methods to increase public participation within the National 
Health System (NHS) governance (Myant and Urquhart 2009). Unlike conven-
tional non-market valuation techniques such as contingent valuation, deliberative 
group methods are based on the assumption that the values people hold regarding 
matters of collective choice can be constructed through the process of reasoned 
discourse with other members of society (Howarth and Wilson 2006).
Renn (2006) argues that deliberative processes are, according to Habermasian 
principles, better suited for dealing with environmental challenges than expert 
judgment as they can produce a common understanding among different parties, 
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new options for actions and solutions to the problem. Concepts, such as sustain-
able development are continuously contested in a struggle about their meaning, 
interpretation and implementation (Hajer and Versteeg 2005). What is expressed 
during a consultation (whatever its form), is something beyond the beliefs and 
ideas of an individual or a group. In his paper on ‘Gramsci and the Theory of 
Hegemony,’ Bates stated that “the basic premise of the theory of hegemony is one 
with which few would disagree: that man is not ruled by force alone, but also by 
ideas” (1975, 351). People’s attitudes and perceptions towards the environment 
tend to be constructed and reproduced at various levels throughout society and by a 
variety of social groups, and are dependent on the dominant ideologies (Kilbourne 
et al. 2002). Through the deconstruction of the structures that we take for granted, 
discourse analysis tries to show that the given organization of the world is a result 
of political processes with social consequences (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). 
Perceptions in society are formed and are dependent on factors such as the 
hegemonic ideas of the times, legitimacy and benefits to an individual or the soci-
ety as a whole. According to Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, different dis-
courses represent different ways of talking about and understanding the social 
world, and are engaged with one another to achieve hegemony, meaning to fix the 
meaning of language in their own way (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002). Institutions 
also form and determine perceptions and choices (Vatn 2005). There tends to be 
one dominant ideology, which denotes the values, beliefs, and morals shared by 
the majority of the people in a given society and frames how the majority of the 
population think about the nature of their society (Abercrombie and Turner 1978). 
There is a constant power struggle between different discourses going on, 
regarding the domination or hegemony of defining the identity of ‘objects’ 
(Howarth 2000). Within each discourse for example, the Dogger Bank has its 
own meaning: within the energy discourse, the importance of wind farms is high-
lighted, whilst fisheries is highlighted within both the consumption and cultural 
discourses. Conservation is also highlighted within the ecological importance dis-
course. At the same time, both wind farms and fisheries fall within the need for 
economic growth discourse, whereas conserving the Dogger Bank ecosystem is 
regarded as important and with its own inherent value.
Power is found in all discourses since “communication is at all times already 
penetrated by power: “power is always present” (Foucault 1988, 11, 18 in 
Flyvbjerg 1998). Which begs the question: can workshops ever provide an equal 
footing for participants? Public participation has been advocated to legitimize 
management decision-making, yet participants in the public sphere do not leave 
their status and interests behind when they deliberate.
In order to explore public attitudes on direct and non-direct uses of the Dogger 
Bank, a citizens-jury inspired deliberative workshop was held. As a method, the 
citizens jury was developed in a number of countries as a means to improve 
public involvement in policy decision-making, with many examples in the UK 
coming from the area of health policy (Glasner 2001; Kashefi and Mort 2004). 
Citizens juries involve witnesses who are people knowledgeable of the issue in 
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question or strong advocates of particular positions in the debate and jurors, citi-
zens selected according to particular criteria (Huitema et al. 2007). Citizens juries 
and consensus conferences tend to rest on the Habermasian assumption that the 
deliberative process leads the participants to arrive at common and more rational 
conclusions (Habermas 1984). Consensus-oriented participatory processes have 
received much criticism, particularly from feminist theory and the field of Science 
and Technology Studies (STS) (Fraser 1985). The main criticism is that consen-
sus-seeking processes will likely have the effect that minority perspectives are 
silenced while other perspectives which either have strong advocates or simply 
are defended by the majority will dominate the process. The reduction of reason 
for example in Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action (1984), excludes 
women and other marginalized groups by universally, rather than socially and 
historically defining rationality and subjectivity, in this way representing the spe-
cific interests of dominant power configurations (Travers 1987).
3. Methodology
As part of an EU funded project, VECTORS, a workshop was held in the form 
of a mixed citizens jury/deliberative workshop to explore what both traditional 
stakeholders (e.g. fishers, environmental NGOs, wind farm developers) and more 
‘ordinary’ citizens (those without a specific “stake” other than being “simply” 
citizens) think about what should be prioritised on the Dogger Bank, and why 
they think so. By organizing the workshop such that people had to deliberate 
together on these issues, our goal was not to have members arrive at consensus, 
but rather to have citizens elaborate on their positions and arguments and to bring 
out some of the nuances and dilemmas in the debate which had been presented 
by expert witnesses. Our primary interest was in uncovering these nuances and 
understanding how choices in the face of dilemmas are weighed. Complementing 
the deliberations was the citizens jury set-up for the workshop. Citizens juries are 
believed to be a solution to the representation problem found in community par-
ticipation efforts whereby small, nonelected elite were dominating the participa-
tory process, not “truly” representative locals (Abel and Stephan 2000; Irvin and 
Stansbury 2004). This format provided expert “witnesses” whose testimony was 
then discussed and deliberated by the participants.
Twenty participants were invited to the workshop. Additionally, three experts 
presented their cases in person and one via Skype, and seven researchers from 
the VECTORS project both observed and served as facilitators. Participants were 
chosen as representing a cross-section of the UK population: equal numbers of 
men and women, varying in ages from young 20s to 70s, with occupations varying 
from students to pensioners to the un-employed to housewives to professionals.
The deliberative workshop consisted of four parts: a brief introduction; an 
icebreaker exercise; the citizens jury, a two-part process including both witness-
ing and the deliberation; and, the monetary valuation/choice experiments. The 
researchers each took different tasks and roles: two took turns serving as facilita-
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tors and workshop organizers; four ran the small, break-out groups; one served as 
“floater” taking notes and observing all groups; one presented the NGO view (an 
ecologist); and each administered a quantitative survey to workshop members and 
interviewed them about the rationale behind their choices on the survey.
The goal of the workshop in this study was not to get the participants to arrive 
at a common conclusion on how the Dogger Bank should be managed, but rather 
to understand all the diverging perspectives and positions, arguments, nuances 
and stakes which are represented among the participants. Likewise, the onto-
logical status of the outcome of the workshops is not a more rational or in other 
ways more correct perspective on ecosystem goods and services on the Dogger 
Bank. Rather, the workshop was expected to shed light on the conflicts, stakes 
and dilemmas involved in prioritizing between different uses of the Dogger Bank. 
The aim of the deliberative approach was twofold: (i) to facilitate a process in 
which the different perspectives and nuances are voiced in order to shed light on dif-
ferent positions in the debate; and (ii) to facilitate a process in which the participant 
can develop their views in dialogue with others. This might lead to consensus, but 
it might also lead to drawing sharper boundaries between particular positions. This 
article focuses exclusively on the witnessing and deliberative aspect of the workshop. 
3.1. Witnessing
The issues related to developing management plans on the Dogger Bank are 
complex, particularly for people who do not have any prior knowledge about the 
Bank. In order to allow for the participants to be informed and be able to delib-
erate on the issue, four witnesses were invited to provide the participants with 
information. Given that the issues are controversial we wanted that the partici-
pants received balanced information and therefore this part of the workshop was 
organised to include both presentations and a question and answer session. Four 
different expert and stakeholder witnesses were given ten minutes each to provide 
the participants with information about different issues and present different argu-
ments/perspectives in the debate. 
The four witnesses included:
•	 A marine biologist from the Joint Nature Conservation Committee 
(JNCC), the advising body to the United Kingdom Government on nature 
conservation issues; 
•	 A fisheries representative (representing fishers who operate trawlers 
within the Dogger Bank area);
•	 A wind farm developer representative; and
•	 A person putting forward the positions of the environmental NGOs. 
All witnesses were physically present for their presentations except the marine 
biologist who conducted the presentation via Skype. At the end of the presenta-
tions, the participants had the opportunity to ask questions. 
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3.2. Deliberation
The participants were split at random into four groups and they were kept in the 
same group throughout the discussions. A facilitator was assigned for each group 
who steered the agenda and made sure that all participants had the opportunity to 
take part in the discussions. The discussions in all four groups were recorded. The 
discussions were divided in two parts, with two issues up for discussion in each 
part. The activities up for discussion were the following:
1. First Session: Values and Uses of the Dogger Bank
a. What does the ocean mean to you? What should we use the ocean 
for? (it was clarified that by ‘uses’ we mean all things we value or 
find meaningful that are provided by the Dogger Bank, therefore 
direct uses (e.g. resource extraction), indirect use (e.g. contribu-
tion to climate regulation) and other valuable things (e.g. biodi-
versity). For this session, the participants were urged to get talking 
about the ocean and thinking about it in depth. 
b. Uses of the Dogger Bank and the impacts/consequences of each use. 
Given the information the participants heard from the witnesses, they 
were asked to identify the uses of the Dogger Bank, their importance 
– to whom and why – and what might be the impact of those uses.
2. Second Session: Conflicts and competing uses of the Dogger Bank
a. Conflicts and dilemmas in the management of the Dogger Bank. 
The facilitator briefly recapped the issues that came up in the pre-
vious session, including the environmental impacts of each use 
and allowed the participants to discuss their views in order to 
allow the exploration of the disagreements around the manage-
ment of the Dogger Bank. Additional questions were put by the 
facilitator for each of the uses in order to identify the opinions of 
the participants such as which are the most important issues and 
which impacts are acceptable.
b. Ranking of competing uses. In this final part, participants were 
asked to rank the uses and conflicts identified in the previous 
activities according to which should be given priority to Dogger 
Bank. Each participant was asked to first, privately rank the uses 
before taking turns showing their preferences and explaining their 
reasoning behind the ranking. Subsequently, the group was asked 
to try and reach consensus on a group ranking.
3.3. Data analysis
All transcripts from the deliberation discussions in the focus groups were inputted 
in the NVIVO 10 software to facilitate the discourse analysis (DA) of the text. 
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NVIVO 10 supports qualitative methods research by allowing the researchers to 
organize and analyze the content of the interviews. The DA of the transcribed 
interviews is based in Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967), an analytic 
approach specifically designed to develop new hypotheses and theoretical propo-
sitions. The particular method was used in the current study to identify the main 
issues/controversies that arose from the discussions within the focus among the 
participants. This approach begins with no a priori hypotheses and involves the 
inductive generation of categories and associations as the analysis proceeds. It 
is important that the researcher has no pre-set or valued hypotheses during this 
initial stage of ‘open coding’ which involves inductively generating categories 
from transcribed text. From the data collected, the key points are marked with 
a series of codes, which are extracted from the text. The codes are grouped into 
similar concepts in order to make the data more workable. From these concepts, 
categories are formed, which are the basis for the creation of a theory, or a reverse 
engineered hypothesis.
4. Dominant discourses from the workshop
The analysis of the discussions during the citizens jury workshop revealed an 
interesting complexity to citizens’ perceptions on ocean commons. During the 
first session, the conversation in the four groups began with a more philosophi-
cal narrative within which the participants highlighted issues such as ‘the beauty 
of the ocean’, ‘the importance of ecosystems’, ‘sustaining the natural habitats’, 
and the ‘uncertainty of the (hu)man-made impacts’. However, when the discus-
sion began being about the uses of the ocean and more specifically of the Dogger 
Bank, the uses became an undisputable reality, and the conversations evolved 
around which use is best and which is worst. 
In deciding which ecosystem goods and services to prioritize, one group opted 
for a ‘no vote’ in their collective ranking as the group did not feel that the informa-
tion given in the limited time was enough to make an informed choice. Another 
group felt there was a need for balance/coexistence in the first place and believed 
that everything had a place in the Dogger Bank. The final two groups pointed out 
that conservation and sustaining the natural environment should be the priority 
when making decisions. Overall, there was a feeling of not having enough infor-
mation provided in order to make an informed decision. 
The juries found the tasks of ranking sectors to be difficult, especially ranking 
the two choices of wind farm development and fishing. One participant stated:
“The fishing and the energy impact has to be balanced with the impact on the 
environment and if the fish are there for hundreds [of years] and we still have 
a fishing resource it must be able to be sustained. … It is the same with the 
wind energy: research has proven that [the Dogger Bank is] one of the best 
places to [fish] and we have said we will go to the most impact areas so they 
are considering the impact on the environment and … eventually the wind 
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energy should become cheaper, so I suppose you have got to consider … the 
long term as well. And with the ocean, it’s having a balance between the two. 
They [fishing and windfarms] are both justifiable.”
Two main themes emerged in the analysis of the discourses from the focus groups 
surrounding potential uses of the Dogger Bank: prioritizing conservation and pri-
oritizing fishing over other activities. The discourse analysis, conducted in the 
same manner for all data, provided for the emergence of these two themes. Within 
theme two, “Prioritizing Fishing,” two strong subthemes emerged (discussed 
below). These subthemes emerged from the amount of data rather than a differ-
ence in method. Space limitations prevent discussions into a deeper analysis of 
the underlying reasons as to why each of these themes exists. 
“Prioritizing Conservation” is a nuanced view in that though conservation is 
deemed to be most important in two groups of the four, this was tempered overall 
with the acknowledgement that other activities are legitimate; the view was of 
“conservation is important, but with caveats.” Thus balance and accommodation 
were also important and in fact “sustainability” is the concept which subsumes 
the various ways participants attempted to put their thoughts and views on the 
subject into words. 
The second theme, “Prioritising Fishing” is one which placed fishing as 
the most important/legitimate activity on the Dogger Bank. Under “Prioritising 
Fishing,” the issues that seem to have shaped the participants’ opinions include 
the lack of evidence to argue that the competing developments (such as wind-
farms) can be ‘safe for the environment’, historical legitimacy and witness or 
participant-derived biases, where a witness is more persuasive than another, and 
some participants have more knowledge in some of the issues discussed than oth-
ers, shifting the conversation towards a certain line of thought. 
4.1. Theme 1: Conservation should be a priority, with caveats
The intrinsic value of the Dogger Bank and the ocean in general came up through-
out the discussions in the focus groups. A conversation in one of the focus groups 
shows the worries of the participants in balancing the uses of the ocean and the 
Dogger Bank in particular with ensuring its protection: 
“Participant1: “I was thinking about the beauty of the natural environment, its 
God’s creation, the beauty of the different colours and the birds, just the beauty of 
that creation. But then I was also thinking about it as a human resource; it is there 
for energy, so we have got to make decisions about the next generation. We don’t 
know how in doing some things that it’s going to be sustainable into the future.”
Participant 2: “My main thing is the disturbance to the nature, not necessarily 
essential to us but essential to their lives as well. We are thinking about our future, 
but we are not thinking about other creatures.”
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Participant 3: “You feel torn because other creatures have been here for hundreds 
of years.”
Participant 4: “We have got a right to live and eat, etc. but we have also got a 
responsibility to take into consideration other things.”
Moreover, another workshop participant from a different group drew attention 
to the fact that economics are very important in decision-making: 
 “Participant: “All this about getting the resource, but to get the resource, you 
have to protect it. You will end up in a financial world and it’s not about the sea.”
Participants in general understood the intrinsic value of the Dogger Bank 
but also its value in terms of its economic potential (mainly regarding food/
fishing and energy). In understanding the way participants ranked the differ-
ent uses/services of the bank, the word balance kept coming up and the need 
to protect it for future generations as the following quote from one of the focus 
groups shows:
Participant 1: 
“Economically we need to utilize it but with a balance. I don’t see it as prior-
itizing it in that sense, but I am concerned about taking away from it as in tak-
ing away something that… will that lower the depth at which the bank stays or 
will that be replenished by green energy? If it is continuing being replenished 
that’s fair enough, but it has to be done in a way where it has the least impact 
in the natural sense.”
Participant 2: 
“First of all I wrote down that it needs to be sustainable and I just that word 
in the sense of thinking about the future generations and not destroying things 
that have been replenished. It has to be a solution that can go on and on and 
on and then I think if you are asking about who takes priority, I just think it is 
balance, we need some economics and a bit of conservation.” 
The above quotes are an indication of both the understanding of the intrinsic value 
of the ocean by the participants but also the acceptance of the prominence of 
economics in decision-making. It is also possible that one or more of the partici-
pants held back in expressing their complete views. In one of the focus groups 
for example, one researcher observed that one participant appeared very skepti-
cal during discussions on conservation versus other more economic uses of the 
Dogger Bank. When urged by the facilitator for his/her opinion, it appeared that 
the participant was leaning towards a more extensive conservation approach than 
the rest of the participants in that small group, but did not speak up (could have 
been conflict-averse).
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4.2. Theme 2: Fishing should be prioritized over the wind farm 
development
During the focus group discussions and the ranking exercise, of the non-conser-
vation activities presented, only fishing and renewable energy generation were 
presented as activities. In discussions, the majority of the participants favored 
fishing in the Dogger Bank over the construction of wind farms. In this discursive 
theme, we will go beyond simply presenting the arguments put for and against 
the two activities. Rather, taking it a step further, this section will present two 
underlying themes which provide reasons (formed before or during the work-
shop), which informed the preference of fishing over the wind farm development. 
Understanding the reasoning for the preferences is more important than simply 
knowing how the participants rank the different uses, especially since they were 
only given two non-conservation options. Participants expressed support for dif-
ferent uses depending how much they felt that use was sustainable and how that 
sustainability has been defended by (mainly) the witnesses. The participants also 
found that it was important to know who profits from the uses (family business 
versus big companies) and how they would be economically affected by any 
changes or decisions.
4.2.1. Presented evidence
Uncertainties as to whether the wind-farm would generate enough and cheaper 
energy, what the effect will be on the marine environment and whether that impact 
would be short or long-term or even irreversible. The participants did not feel 
they received enough information to make a decision. Additionally, evidence pre-
sented with data, as opposed to hypotheticals also made a difference. Specifically, 
the fishing industry was able to provide evidence from their activities, while the 
wind farm development witness could only present a hypothetical situation since 
their activities are only proposed and not yet up-and-running. 
Participant 1:
“At the moment I am all for the fisheries because we haven’t got any evidence 
about what affect the wind farms are going to have, we don’t know the long 
term affects. Whereas fisheries as shown on the graphs, the fishing is populat-
ing and it sound more sustainable and they are using specialist nets to make 
sure they are not catching other species.”
Participant 2:
“It’s just the wind farms that sits a bit heavy with me because of the fact that 
we don’t know what implications it’s going to have on the environment and I 
think if I had a bit more information about that then I would look at it in a dif-
ferent light if the facts were there, whereas it was just a proposal, there wasn’t 
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any scientific implications, so obviously we need a bit more information on 
that before you could look at it.”
Despite the evidence for the sustainability of fishing within the Dogger Bank, par-
ticipants expressed their worries about the impacts of trawling on the sea bed and 
acknowledged that even though it has been suggested that fishing is monitored 
and is sustainable one cannot be absolutely certain. Nevertheless, there is more 
evidence for the sustainability of fishing than for the wind farm development and 
this shifted the preference of the participants. 
4.2.2. Historical legitimacy
An important factor for the preference of fishing over the development of wind 
farms was that of the historical legitimacy of fishing activities. As shown in the 
two following quotes from participants who were in different focus groups, it is 
argued that if we are to have to choose between uses, the one which is already 
happening and can prove that it can be done sustainably should be given priority.
Participant 1
“The biggest issue of worry is them producing wind farms. Fishing and con-
servation is already in place at the area, it’s the introduction of these wind 
farms that is more worrying with how it is going to have a knock on effect 
with everything else in the Dogger Bank.”
Participant 2:
“Fishing has been in place for years, so any changes to the environment will 
already been affected and it’s not something that we would notice in our life-
times. I don’t feel that they are going to impact now because they have been 
there for so long.”
5. Conclusion
In looking at a specific geographical part of an ocean commons such as the Dogger 
Bank in the North Sea, it is the human element which makes such an ecosystem a 
commons. With the sustainability view and the views that such commons should 
be considered common heritage of mankind (CHM), how do we manage it for the 
benefit of all? How do we structure the utilization, or argue for the preservation, 
of the resources found therein? Contemporary thought advocates for public par-
ticipation. With the deconstruction of discussions held during the Dogger Bank 
citizens jury workshop, this paper presents some limits to public participation. 
There seemed to be a number of reasons behind the choices made by the par-
ticipants on the different uses and services of the Dogger Bank. Conserving the 
natural environment and biodiversity of the Bank was generally ranked as the top 
priority, but with caveats. Given these caveats, what participants actually argued 
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for could be said to be sustainable development – balancing the need for primary 
activities with nature – as opposed to outright conservation, which is the dominant 
ideology framing how the majority of the population think. Within this frame of 
thought, the Dogger Bank, as a marine commons is conceptualized as an eco-
nomic resource. Many of the participants were in agreement in allowing multiple 
activities by zoning the Dogger Bank, but a lack of information made it difficult 
to discuss these activities in further detail. Would these responses be valid and 
possibly taken on-board if our workshop was an actual public consultation for the 
future of the Dogger Bank? We suggest that they may well could have been, and 
the reason for this, we argue, is that the views of the workshop are in agreement 
with the dominant ideas of today’s growth-driven economy. And this, we hope, 
is one of the main contributions of this paper; as Fraser (1990) argues, another 
example of “the limits of the specific form of democracy we enjoy in contempo-
rary capitalist societies.”
What this workshop advocates is that preferences are not necessarily ‘revealed’ 
as much as they are ‘constructed’ during elicitation, and therefore constructed 
preferences are particularly ‘context dependent’ (Slovic 1995). Supported by the 
literature referenced in the introduction, the jury has been influenced/transformed 
in the course of the deliberative process, though at the same time some of the jury 
also influenced others. Consequently, the workshop elicited the issues of power 
inherent in such events. Issues of power identified relate to how the workshop is 
organized (who is supporting an issue, how skilled the presenter is and whether 
the person is physically present or not); certainty of information presented; and 
the historical legitimacy of the various activities. Thus, jury members’ percep-
tions will be affected depending on the choice of information the organizers of 
the workshop make available. From the analysis of the workshop for example, 
we can see that the fact that not all of the witnesses were physically present may 
have had an impact on the formation of the participants’ opinions. This may be 
due to the fact that face-to-face presentations are stronger than ones made through 
a computer, or perhaps also more importantly, for the witnesses being present to 
satisfactorily answer participants’ questions during the focus groups. This was 
particularly the case with the representative of the fishing industry. The represen-
tative made a very strong case for fisheries in his presentation and he was able to 
clarify and expand when answering questions of the jury members during the break 
out groups. Furthermore, some participants felt that they were not given adequate 
facts by all witnesses to make an informed decision. Additionally, the offshore 
wind-farm industry representative was unable to give a scientific response on the 
potential impacts of the industry due to lack of data, partly because of this being 
a new industry, potentially shaped the participants’ views. Taking the case of fish-
ing, for example, it was not clear how fishers would be impacted if fishing was 
banned from the Dogger Bank; where, for example, would fishing vessels conduct 
their fishing activities if kept away from the Bank? Consequently, participants’ 
views and opinions were impacted by what they felt to be missing explanations 
and information.
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Participating individuals can also influence the process as happened in our 
case as a citizen participant present at the workshop worked in the energy man-
agement sector and thus had a privilege in having background knowledge in the 
specifics of energy management and suggested that offshore wind-farms could 
lead to a change in the biodiversity without actually reducing electricity bills 
influenced other participants’ views. 
Efforts for increasing public participation in environmental decision-making 
are important as positive attempts to encourage more people to become involved 
in decision-making processes and could therefore be described as ‘bottom-up’ to 
some degree (Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger 1998). However, it is important 
to appreciate that they are nevertheless undertaken within an institutional, politi-
cal, and legal framework that remains ‘top-down’ and it therefore remains inflex-
ible to potentially important socio-ecological change. As people apply different 
behaviors in different institutional settings, this neatly fits the cognitive model 
where these issues are two sides of the same coin. Choosing policy instruments is 
thus not simply about changing incentives. First of all it is about instituting certain 
logics, about understanding which institutional frames people apply, and about 
influencing these frames.
These observations raise a set of issues relevant for the analysis of envi-
ronmental questions. The most basic challenge is to choose which institutional 
frame best fits the issues at hand. This second order question must be evalu-
ated both in the short and long run. There are two arguments for supporting a 
more citizens oriented focus. First, environmental issues are basically about 
the common good, about how we interact in each other’s lives. Second, con-
structing institutions that emphasize a citizen’s perspective and the common 
responsibilities involved supports the strengthening of trust and engagement 
in forming the common good that environmental policy in the end so crucially 
depends upon.
In focusing on citizen engagement, this article presented the advantages of 
particular methods for stakeholder involvement in environmental decision-mak-
ing with the example of a citizens jury-inspired deliberative workshop on the 
Dogger Bank. Our case study showed both advantages – through witness pre-
sentations and citizen discussions and discourse – and disadvantages – through 
members feeling unequal to speaking up and the importance of the carefully 
choosing witnesses and facilitators. Understanding the limitations of such 
methods as citizens juries will improve decision-making processes by enabling 
reflexive choice of stakeholder participatory methods. Without knowing the 
strengths and weaknesses of such methods, managers are unable to receive the 
appropriate and desired stakeholder feedback. Acknowledging the limits to pub-
lic participation does not suggest its abandonment but rather rethinking pub-
lic participation towards going beyond the mere ‘inclusion’ of voices to full, 
well-supported participation. But the assertion of a common good can only be 
achieved if we step away from the current policy focus on economic growth. In 
order to successfully strive towards the protection of common heritage, society 
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first needs to first envision it as such in order to allow for the creation of new 
institutional arrangements which will be just for the society as a whole and for 
future generations.
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